Thomas Aquinas held and practiced the principle that truth is to be accepted no matter where it is found. His doctrines drew from Greek, Roman, Islamic and Jewish philosophers. Specifically, he was a realist (i.e. unlike skeptics, he believed that the world can be known as it is). He often affirmed Aristotle's views with independent arguments, and largely followed Aristotelian terminology and metaphysics. He wrote comprehensive commentaries on Aristotle, and respectfully referred to him simply as "the Philosopher".[4]
He also adhered to some neoplatonic principles, for example that "it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, ... [and that] everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation..."[5]
With the decree Postquam sanctissimus of 27 July 1914,[6] Pope Pius X declared that 24 theses formulated by "teachers from various institutions ... clearly contain the principles and more important thoughts" of Aquinas. Principal contributors to the Church's official statement of the "24 Theses" of Thomism include Dominican philosopher and theologian Edouard Hugon of the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum and Jesuit philosopher theologian Guido Mattiussi of the Pontifical Gregorian University.
Thomism is the philosophical school that arose as a legacy of the work and thought of Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), philosopher, theologian, and Doctor of the Church. In philosophy, Aquinas' disputed questions and commentaries on Aristotle are perhaps his best-known works.
In theology, his Summa Theologica is amongst the most influential documents in medieval theology and continues to be the central point of reference for the philosophy and theology of the Catholic Church. In the 1914 encyclical Doctoris Angelici[1] Pope Pius X cautioned that the teachings of the Church cannot be understood without the basic philosophical underpinnings of Aquinas' major theses:
The capital theses in the philosophy of St. Thomas are not to be placed in the category of opinions capable of being debated one way or another, but are to be considered
In theology, his Summa Theologica is amongst the most influential documents in medieval theology and continues to be the central point of reference for the philosophy and theology of the Catholic Church. In the 1914 encyclical Doctoris Angelici[1] Pope Pius X cautioned that the teachings of the Church cannot be understood without the basic philosophical underpinnings of Aquinas' major theses:
The capital theses in the philosophy of St. Thomas are not to be placed in the category of opinions capable of being debated one way or another, but are to be considered as the foundations upon which the whole science of natural and divine things is based; if such principles are once removed or in any way impaired, it must necessarily follow that students of the sacred sciences will ultimately fail to perceive so much as the meaning of the words in which the dogmas of divine revelation are proposed by the magistracy of the Church.[2]
The Second Vatican Council described Aquinas' system as the "Perennial Philosophy."[3]
He also adhered to some neoplatonic principles, for example that "it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, ... [and that] everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation..."[5]
With the decree Postquam sanctissimus of 27 July 1914,[6] Pope Pius X declared that 24 theses formulated by "teachers from various institutions ... clearly contain the principles and more important thoughts" of Aquinas. Principal contributors to the Church's official statement of the "24 Theses" of Thomism include Dominican philosopher and theologian Edouard Hugon of the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum and Jesuit philosopher theologian Guido Mattiussi of the Pontifical Gregorian University.
Aquinas says that the fundamental axioms of ontology are the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of causality. Therefore, any being that does not contradict these two laws could theoretically exist,[7] even if said being were incorporeal.[8]
Aquinas noted three forms of descriptive language when predicating: univocal, analogical, and equivocal.[9]
Further, the usage of "definition" that Aquinas gives is the genus of the being, plus a difference that sets it apart from the genus itself. For instance, the Aristotelian definition of "man" is "rational animal"; its genus being animal, and what sets apart man from other animals is his rationality.[10]
[E]xistence is twofold: one is essential existence or the substantial existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence simpliciter. The other is neoplatonic principles, for example that "it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, ... [and that] everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation..."[5]
With the decree Postquam sanctissimus of 27 July 1914,[6] Pope Pius X declared that 24 theses formulated by "teachers from various institutions ... clearly contain the principles and more important thoughts" of Aquinas. Principal contributors to the Church's official statement of the "24 Theses" of Thomism include Dominican philosopher and theologian Edouard Hugon of the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum and Jesuit philosopher theologian Guido Mattiussi of the Pontifical Gregorian University.
Aquinas noted three forms of descriptive language when predicating: univocal, analogical, and equivocal.[9]
Further, the usage of "definition" that Aquinas gives is the genus of the being, plus a difference that sets it apart from the genus itself. For instance, the Aristotelian definition of "man" is "rational animal"; its genus being animal, and what sets apart man from other animals is his rationality.[10]
[E]xistence is twofold: one is essential existence or the substantial existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence simpliciter. The other is accidental existence, for example man is white, and this is existence secundum quid.
In Thomist philosophy, the definition of a being is "that which is," which is composed of two parts: "which" refers to its quiddity (literally "whatness"), and "is" refers to its esse (the Latin infinitive verb "to be").[11] "Quiddity" is synonymous with essence, form and nature; whereas "esse" refers to the principle of the being's existence. In other words, a being is "an essence that exists."[12]
Being is divided in two ways: that which is in itself (substances), and that which is in another (accidents). Substances are things which exist per se or in their own right. Accidents are qualities that apply to other things, such as shape or color: "[A]ccidents must include in their definition a subject which is outside their genus."[13] Because they only exist in other things, Aquinas holds that metaphysics is primarily the study of substances, as they are the primary mode of being.[14]
The Catholic Encyclopedia pinpoints Aquinas' definition of quiddity as "that which is expressed by its definition."[15] The quiddity or form of a thing is what makes the object what it is: "[T]hrough the form, which is the actuality of matter, matter becomes something actual and something individual,"[16] and also, "the form causes matter to be."[17] Thus, it consists of two parts: "prime matter" (matter without form),[18] and substantial form, which is what causes a substance to have its characteristics. For instance, an animal can be said to be a being whose matter is its body, and whose soul[19] is its substantial form.[20][21] Together, these consist of its quiddity/essence.
All real things have the transcendental properties of being: oneness, truth, goodness (that is, all things have a final cause and therefore a purpose), etc.[22]
Aristotle categorized causality into four subsets in the Metaphysics, which is an integral part of Thomism:
"In one sense the term cause means (a) that from which, as something intrinsic, a thing comes to be, as the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet, and the genera of these. In another sense it means (b) the form and pattern of a thing, i.e., the intelligible expression of the quiddity and its genera (for example, the ratio of 2:1 and number in general are the cause of an octave chord) and the parts which are included in the intelligible expression. Again, (c) that from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes is a cause; for example, an adviser is a cause, and a father is the cause of a child, and in general a maker is a cause of the thing made, and a changer a cause of the thing changed. Further, a thing is a cause (d) inasmuch as it is an end, i.e., that for the sake of which something is done; for example, health is the cause of walking. For if we are asked why someone took a walk, we answer, "in order to be healthy"; and in saying this we think we have given the cause. And whatever occurs on the way to the end under the motion of something else is also a cause. For example, reducing, purging, drugs and instruments are causes of health; for all of these exist for the sake of the end, although they differ from each other inasmuch as some are instruments and others are processes."
Aquinas noted three forms of descriptive language when predicating: univocal, analogical, and equivocal.[9]
Further, the usage of "definition" that Aquinas gives is the genus of the being, plus a difference that sets it apart from the genus itself. For instance, the Aristotelian definition of "man" is "rational animal"; its genus being animal, and what sets apart man from other animals is his rationality.[10]
[E]xistence is twofold: one is essential existence or the substantial existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence simpliciter. The other is substantial existence of a thing, for example man exists, and this is existence simpliciter. The other is accidental existence, for example man is white, and this is existence secundum quid.
In Thomist philosophy, the definition of a being is "that which is," which is composed of two parts: "which" refers to its quiddity (literally "whatness"), and "is" refers to its esse (the Latin being is "that which is," which is composed of two parts: "which" refers to its quiddity (literally "whatness"), and "is" refers to its esse (the Latin infinitive verb "to be").[11] "Quiddity" is synonymous with essence, form and nature; whereas "esse" refers to the principle of the being's existence. In other words, a being is "an essence that exists."[12]
Being is divided in two ways: that which is in itself (substances), and that which is in another (substances), and that which is in another (accidents). Substances are things which exist per se or in their own right. Accidents are qualities that apply to other things, such as shape or color: "[A]ccidents must include in their definition a subject which is outside their genus."[13] Because they only exist in other things, Aquinas holds that metaphysics is primarily the study of substances, as they are the primary mode of being.[14]
The Catholic Encyclopedia pinpoints Aquinas' definition of quiddity as "that which is expressed by its definition."[15] The quiddity or form of a thing is what makes the object what it is: "[T]hrough the form, which is the actuality of matter, matter becomes something actual and something individual,"[16] and also, "the form causes matter to be."[17] Thus, it consists of two parts: "prime matter" (matter without form),[18] and substantial form, which is what causes a substance to have its characteristics. For instance, an animal can be said to be a being whose matter is its body, and whose soul[19] is its substantial form.[20][21] Together, these consist of its quiddity/essence.
All real things have the transcendental properties of being: oneness, truth, goodness (that is, all things have a final cause and therefore a purpose), etc.[22]
Aristotle categorized causality into four subsets in the Metaphysics, which is an integral part of Thomism:
"In one sense the term cause means (a) that from which, as something intrinsic, a thing comes to be, as the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet, and the genera of these. I
"In one sense the term cause means (a) that from which, as something intrinsic, a thing comes to be, as the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet, and the genera of these. In another sense it means (b) the form and pattern of a thing, i.e., the intelligible expression of the quiddity and its genera (for example, the ratio of 2:1 and number in general are the cause of an octave chord) and the parts which are included in the intelligible expression. Again, (c) that from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes is a cause; for example, an adviser is a cause, and a father is the cause of a child, and in general a maker is a cause of the thing made, and a changer a cause of the thing changed. Further, a thing is a cause (d) inasmuch as it is an end, i.e., that for the sake of which something is done; for example, health is the cause of walking. For if we are asked why someone took a walk, we answer, "in order to be healthy"; and in saying this we think we have given the cause. And whatever occurs on the way to the end under the motion of something else is also a cause. For example, reducing, purging, drugs and instruments are causes of health; for all of these exist for the sake of the end, although they differ from each other inasmuch as some are instruments and others are processes."
The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that "to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good." But the good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last end.
However, the First Cause does not necessarily have to be temporally the first. Thus, the question of whether or not the universe can be imagined as eternal was fiercely debated in the Middle Ages. The University of Paris's condemnation of 1270 denounced the belief that the world is eternal. Aquinas' intellectual rival, Bonaventure, held that the temporality of the universe is demonstrable by reason.[29][30] Aquinas' position was that the temporality of the world is an article of faith, and not demonstrable by reason; though one could reasonably conclude either that the universe is temporal or eternal.[31][32]
As per the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle,[33] Aquinas defines "the good" as what all things strive for. E.g., a cutting knife is said to be good if it is effective at its function, cutting. As all things have a function/final cause, all real things are good. Consequently, evil is nothing but privatio boni, or "lack of good", as Augustine of Hippo defined it.[34]
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), 'Evil is neither a being nor a good.' I answer that, one opposite
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), 'Evil is neither a being nor a good.' I answer that, one opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that 'evil is neither a being nor a good.' For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.
As God is the ultimate end of all things,[36] God is by essence goodness itself.As God is the ultimate end of all things,[36] God is by essence goodness itself.[37] Furthermore, since love is "to wish the good of another,"[38] true love in Thomism is to lead another to God. Hence why John the Evangelist says, "Whoever is without love does not know God, for God is love."[39][40]
Thomas Aquinas holds that the existence of God can be demonstrated by reason,[41] a view that is taught by the Catholic Church.[42] The quinque viae (Latin: five ways) found in the Summa Theologica (I, Q.2, art.3) are five possible ways of demonstrating the existence of God,[43] which today are categorized as:
Despite this, Aquinas also thought that sacred mysteries such as the Trinity could only be obtained through revelation; though these truths cannot contradict reason:
The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
See also Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic ThoughtSee also Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought: Chapter 7: The Proofs Of God's Existence by Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.
Aquinas articulated and defended, both as a philosopher and a theologian, the orthodox Christian view of God. God is the sole being whose existence is the same as His essence: "what subsists in God is His existence."[46] (Hence why God names himself "I Am that I Am" in Exodus 3:14.[47]) Consequently, God cannot be a body (that is, He cannot be composed of matter),[48] He cannot have any accidents,[49] and He must be simple (that is, not separated into parts; the Trinity is one substance in three persons).[50] Further, He is goodness itself,[37] perfect,[51] infinite,[52] omnipotent,[53] omniscient,[54] happiness itself,[55] knowledge itself,[56] love itself,[40] omnipresent,[57] immutable,[58] and eternal.[59] Summing up these properties, Aquinas offers the term actus purus (Latin: "pure actuality").
Aquinas held that not only does God have knowledge of everything,[54] but that God has "the most perfect knowledge," and that it is also true to say
Aquinas held that not only does God have knowledge of everything,[54] but that God has "the most perfect knowledge," and that it is also true to say that God "is" His understanding.[56]
Aquinas also understands God as the transcendent cause of the universe, the "first Cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him," the source of all creaturely being and the cause of every other cause.[60] Consequently, God's causality is not like the causality of any other causes (all other causes are "secondary causes"), because He is the transcendent source of all being, causing and sustaining every other existing thing at every instant. Consequently, God's causality is never in competition with the causality of creatures; rather, God even causes some things through the causality of creatures.[61]
Aquinas was an advocate of the "analogical way", which says that because God is infinite, people can only speak of God by analogy, for some of the aspects of the divine nature are hidden (Deus absconditus) and others revealed (Deus revelatus) to finite human minds. Thomist philosophy holds that we can know about God through his creation (general revelation), but only in an analogous manner.[62] For instance, we can speak of God's goodness only by understanding that goodness as applied to humans is similar to, but not identical with, the goodness of God. Further, he argues that sacred scripture employs figurative language: "Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things."[63]
In order to demonstrate God's creative power, Aquinas says: "If a being participates, to a certain degree, in an 'accident,' this accidental property must have been communicated to it by a cause which possesses it essentially. Thus iron becomes incandescent by the action of fire. Now, God is His own power which subsists by itself. The being which subsists by itself is necessarily one."[23]
In addition to agreeing with the Aristotelian definition of man as "the rational animal,"[10] Aquinas also held various other beliefs about the substance of man. For instance, as the essence (nature) of all men are the same,[64] and the definition of being is "an essence that exists,"[12] humans that are real therefore only differ by their specific qualities. More generally speaking, all beings of the same genus have the same essence, and so long as they exist, only differ by accidents and substantial form.[65]
Thomists define the soul as the substantial form of living beings.[66] Thus, plants have "vegetative souls," animals have "sensitive souls,"[19] while human beings alone have "intellectual" – rational and immortal – souls.[67]
For Aristotle, the soul is one, but endowed with five groups of faculties (dunámeis): (1) the "vegetative" faculty (threptikón), concerned with the maintenance and development of organic life; (2) the appetite (oretikón), or the tendency to any good; (3) the faculty of s
Thomists define the soul as the substantial form of living beings.[66] Thus, plants have "vegetative souls," animals have "sensitive souls,"[19] while human beings alone have "intellectual" – rational and immortal – souls.[67]
For Aristotle, the soul is one, but endowed with five groups of faculties (dunámeis): (1) the "vegetative" faculty (threptikón), concerned with the ma
For Aristotle, the soul is one, but endowed with five groups of faculties (dunámeis): (1) the "vegetative" faculty (threptikón), concerned with the maintenance and development of organic life; (2) the appetite (oretikón), or the tendency to any good; (3) the faculty of sense perception (aisthetikón); (4) the "locomotive" faculty (kinetikón), which presides over the various bodily movements; and (5) reason (dianoetikón). The Scholastics generally follow Aristotle's classification. For them body and soul are united in one complete substance. The soul is the forma substantialis, the vital principle, the source of all activities. Hence their science of the soul deals with functions which nowadays belong to the provinces of biology and physiology. [...] The nature of the mind and its relations to the organism are questions that belong to philosophy or metaphysics.
Aquinas affirms Aristotle
Aquinas affirms Aristotle's definition of happiness as "an operation according to perfect virtue",[68][69] and that "happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good."[70] Aquinas defines virtue as a good habit, which is a good quality of a person demonstrated by his actions and reactions over a substantial period of time.[71] He writes:
As we have said above (Article 1), virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of a
As we have said above (Article 1), virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works.
In accordance with Roman Catholic theology, Aquinas argues that humans can neither wish nor do Roman Catholic theology, Aquinas argues that humans can neither wish nor do good without divine grace.[73] However, "doing good" here refers to doing good per se: man can do, moved by God even then but "only" in the sense in which even his nature depends on God's moving, things that happen to be good in some respect, and are not sinful, though if he has not grace, it will be without merit, and he will not succeed in it all the time. Therefore, happiness is attained through the perseverance of virtue given by the Grace of God,[74] which is not fully attained on earth;[75] only at the beatific vision.[76][77] Notably, man cannot attain true happiness without God.[55][78]
Regarding emotion (used synonymously with the word "passion" in this context), which, following John Damascene,[79] Aquinas defines as "a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil," Thomism repudiates both the Epicurean view that happiness consists in pleasure (sensual experiences that invoke positive emotion),[80][81] and the Stoic view that emotions are vices by nature.[82] Aquinas takes a moderate view of emotion, quoting Augustine: "They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good."[83] While most emotions are morally neutral, some are inherently virtuous (e.g. pity)[84] and some are inherently vicious (e.g. envy).[85]
Thomist ethics hold that it is necessary to observe both circumstances[86] and intention[87] to determine an action's moral value, and therefore Aquinas cannot be said to be strictly either a deontologicalist or a consequentialist. Rather, he would say that an action is morally good if it fulfills God's antecedent will.[88]
Of note is the principle of double effect, formulated in the Summa, II-II, Q.64, art.7, which is a justification of homicide in self-defense. Previously experiencing difficulties in the world of Christian philosophy, the doctrine of Just War was expounded by Aquinas with this principle. He says:
In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged... Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault... Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil...
Aquinas argues that the Mosaic covenant was divine, though rightfully only given to the Jews before Christ;[96] whereas the New Covenant replaces the Old Covenant[97] and is meant for all humans.[98]
In the first half of the twentieth century Angelicum professors Edouard Hugon, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange among others, carried on Leo's call for a Thomist revival. Their approach is reflected in many of the manualsAngelicum professors Edouard Hugon, Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange among others, carried on Leo's call for a Thomist revival. Their approach is reflected in many of the manuals[133] and textbooks widely in use in Roman Catholic colleges and seminaries before Vatican II.
While the Second Vatican Council took place from 1962-1965 Cornelio Fabro was already able to write in 1949 that the century of revival with its urgency to provide a synthetic systematization and defense of Aquinas' thought was coming to an end. Fabro looked forward to a more constructive period in which the original context of Aquinas' thought would be explored.[134]
A summary of some recent and current schools and interpretations of Thomism can be found, among other places, in La Metafisica di san Tommaso d'Aquino e i suoi interpreti (2002), by Battista Mondin, Being and Some 20th Century Thomists (2003), by John F. X. Knasas as well as in the writing of Edward Feser.[135]
Due to its suspicion of attempts to harmonize Aquinas with non-Thomistic categories and assumptions, Neo-Scholastic Thomism has sometimes been called "strict observance Thomism."[135] A discussion of recent and current Neo-Scholastic Thomism can be found in La Metafisica di san Tommaso d'Aquino e i suoi
Due to its suspicion of attempts to harmonize Aquinas with non-Thomistic categories and assumptions, Neo-Scholastic Thomism has sometimes been called "strict observance Thomism."[135] A discussion of recent and current Neo-Scholastic Thomism can be found in La Metafisica di san Tommaso d'Aquino e i suoi interpreti (2002) by Battista Mondin, which includes such figures as Martin Grabmann, Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, Sofia Vanni Rovighi (1908–1990),[136] Cornelio Fabro (1911–1995), Carlo Giacon (1900–1984),[137] Tomáš Týn (1950–1990), Abelardo Lobato (1925–2012), Leo Elders (b. 1926) and Giovanni Ventimiglia (b. 1964) among others. Fabro in particular emphasizes Aquinas' originality, especially with respect to the actus essendi or act of existence of finite beings by participating in being itself. Other scholars such as those involved with the "Progetto Tommaso"[138] seek to establish an objective and universal reading of Aquinas' texts.[139]
Cracow Circle Thomism[135] (named after Cracow) has been called "the most significant expression of Catholic thought between the two World Wars."[140] The Circle was founded by a group of philosophers and theologians that in distinction to more traditional Neo-Scholastic Thomism embraced modern formal logic as an analytical tool for traditional Thomist philosophy and theology.[140]
Inspired by the logical clarity of Aquinas, members of the Circle held both philosophy and theology to contain "propositions with truth-values…a structured body of propositions connected in meaning and subject matter, and linked by logical relations of compatibility and incompatibility, entailment etc." "The Cracow Circle set about
Inspired by the logical clarity of Aquinas, members of the Circle held both philosophy and theology to contain "propositions with truth-values…a structured body of propositions connected in meaning and subject matter, and linked by logical relations of compatibility and incompatibility, entailment etc." "The Cracow Circle set about investigating and where possible improving this logical structure with the most advanced logical tools available at the time, namely those of modern mathematical logic, then called 'logistic'." [141] Perhaps the most famous exponent of the Cracow Circle is Józef Maria Bocheński, author of A History of Formal Logic (1961), and one of the preeminent twentieth-century historians of logic. Bocheński completed a doctorate in theology at the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelicum in 1934 where he taught logic until 1940. Other members included Jan Salamucha and Jan F. Drewnowski.
Étienne Gilson (1884–1978), the key proponent of existential Thomism,[135] tended to emphasize the importance of historical exegesis but also to deemphasize Aquinas's continuity with the Aristotelian tradition, and like Cornelio Fabro of the Neo-scholastic school, to highlight the originality of Aquinas's doctrine of being as existence. He was also critical of the Neo-Scholastics' focus on the tradition of the commentators, and given what he regarded as their insufficient emphasis on being or existence accused them of "essentialism" (to allude to the other half of Aquinas's distinction between being and essence). Gilson's reading of Aquinas as putting forward a distinctively "Christian philosophy" tended, at least in the view of his critics, to blur Aquinas's distinction between philosophy and theology.[142] Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) introduced into Thomistic metaphysics the notion that philosophical reflection begins with an "intuition of being," and in ethics and social philosophy sought to harmonize Thomism with personalism and pluralistic democracy. Though "existential Thomism" was sometimes presented as a counterpoint to modern existentialism, the main reason for the label is the emphasis this approach puts on Aquinas's doctrine of existence. Contemporary proponents include Joseph Owens and John F. X. Knasas.[135]
Unlike the first three schools mentioned above, transcendental Thomism,[135] associated with Joseph Maréchal (1878–1944), Karl Rahner (1904–84), and Bernard Lonergan (1904–84), does not oppose modern philosophy wholesale, but seeks to reconcile Thomism with a Cartesian subject-centered approach to knowledge in general, and Kantian transcendental philosophy in particular. It seems fair to say that most Thomists otherwise tolerant of diverse approaches to Aquinas's thought tend to regard transcendental Thomism as having conceded too much to modern philosophy genuinely to count as a variety of Thomism, strictly speaking, and this school of thought has in any event been far more influential among theologians than among philosophers.[135]
Lublin Thomism
Lublin Thomism,[135] which derives its name from the Catholic University of Lublin in Poland where it is centered, is also sometimes called "phenomenological Thomism."[135] Like transcendental Thomism, it seeks to combine Thomism with certain elements of modern philosophy. In particular, it seeks to make use of the phenomenological method of philosophical analysis associated with Edmund Husserl and the ethical personalism of writers like Max Scheler in articulating the Thomist conception of the human person. Its best-known proponent is Karol Wojtyla (1920–2005), who went on to become Pope John Paul II.[135]
However, unlike transcendental Thomism, the metaphysics of Lublin Thomism places priority on existence (as opposed to essence), making it an existential Thomism that demonstrates consonance with the Thomism of Étienne Gilson. The phenomenological concerns of the Lublin school are not metaphysical in nature as th
However, unlike transcendental Thomism, the metaphysics of Lublin Thomism places priority on existence (as opposed to essence), making it an existential Thomism that demonstrates consonance with the Thomism of Étienne Gilson. The phenomenological concerns of the Lublin school are not metaphysical in nature as this would constitute idealism. Rather, they are considerations which are brought into relation with central positions of the school, such as when dealing with modern science, its epistemological value, and its relation to metaphysics.[148]
Analytical Thomism[135] described by John Haldane, its key proponent, as "a broad philosophical approach that brings into mutual relationship the styles and preoccupations of recent English-speaking philosophy and the concepts and concerns shared by Aquinas and his followers" (from the article on "analytical Thomism" in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderich). By "recent English-speaking philosophy" Haldane means the analytical tradition founded by thinkers like Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, which tends to dominate academic philosophy in the English-speaking world. Elizabeth Anscombe (1919–2001) and her husband Peter Geach are sometimes considered the first "analytical Thomists," though (like most writers to whom this label has been applied) they did not describe themselves in these terms, and as Haldane's somewhat vague expression "mutual relationship" indicates, there does not seem to be any set of doctrines held in common by all analytical Thomists. What they do have in common seems to be that they are philosophers trained in the analytic tradition who happen to be interested in Aquinas in some way; and the character of their "analytical Thomism" is determined by whether it tends to stress the "analytical" side of analytical Thomism, or the "Thomism" side, or, alternatively, attempts to emphasize both sides equally.[149][150]
In his Against Henry, King of the English, Luther criticized the use of the In his Against Henry, King of the English, Luther criticized the use of the proof by assertion and a reliance on style over substance in the Thomist form of disputation, which he alleged as being, "It seems so to me. I think so. I believe so." Luther also argued that the Thomist method led to shallowness among theological debates in England at the time.[151]
In 1967, Thomism was criticized by Bertrand Russell. Besides this, neo-scholasticism in general, including Thomism, is criticized by some Catholics.
In 1967, Thomism was criticized by Bertrand Russell. Besides this, neo-scholasticism in general, including Thomism, is criticized by some Catholics.